The Shadow Fleet’s Silent Harvest: Tracking the Grumant’s Illicit Grain Route

By Bellingcat Investigation Team

In a sophisticated display of maritime deception, the bulk carrier Grumant (IMO: 9385879) has emerged as a focal point in the ongoing effort to monitor the flow of grain from Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories. Satellite imagery, combined with an innovative analysis of ship-heading data, has traced the vessel’s two-month odyssey from the occupied Port of Feodosia in Crimea to its final destination in Benghazi, Libya.

This investigation highlights the evolving "shadow fleet" tactics employed to monetize resources seized from Ukraine, illustrating how Moscow continues to circumvent international sanctions through opaque logistics and a disregard for sovereign borders.

A Calculated Voyage: The Chronology of Deception

The journey of the Grumant in early 2026 provides a textbook example of how illicit cargo is moved through global waters. The vessel’s path was marked by periods of deliberate signal interference and strategic loitering.

The Black Sea Transit and Signal Interference

On January 29, 2026, the Grumant was observed transiting the Bosphorus Strait under the cover of night. Shortly after clearing the strait, the vessel entered a region of the Black Sea notorious for Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) interference. Within hours, the Grumant’s publicly reported Automated Identification System (AIS) position became unreliable, frequently placing the ship on land or in erratic locations that defied nautical logic.

Loading at Feodosia

By mid-February, the Grumant had reached the occupied Port of Feodosia. High-resolution satellite imagery captured on February 15 confirms the vessel docked at Berth No. 1, a terminal primarily used for bulk and metal cargo. Visual evidence—including the ship’s distinctive grey decking, its seven cargo hatches, and a bright yellow front mast—matched the vessel identified in earlier sightings. Nearby, tell-tale signs of spilled grain were visible on the pier, suggesting a hurried loading operation.

The Turkish "Waiting Game"

Following its departure from Crimea, the Grumant transited back through the Bosphorus, now appearing heavily laden—a conclusion drawn from the lack of visible red hull paint above the waterline, indicating a deep draft.

What followed was a puzzling three-week period. From February 23 to March 13, the Grumant anchored off the coast of Izmir, Turkey, without ever entering the port. It subsequently spent several days loitering off the coast of Aliağa. Whether these movements were a result of denied port entry, bureaucratic delays, or an attempt to obfuscate its destination remains a subject of investigation.

Delivery to Libya

On March 19, the Grumant arrived in Libyan waters. After an initial period of anchorage off the coast of Benghazi, the ship entered the port on April 18. Subsequent satellite imagery from April 20 confirmed the vessel docked at the facility, where it offloaded its cargo. By April 23, the Grumant had departed, beginning its return voyage toward the Bosphorus, leaving behind a trail of evidence that contradicts Russia’s claims of legitimate trade.

Deciphering the "Dirty" Data: How We Tracked the Ghost Ship

Tracking vessels engaged in illicit trade is rarely straightforward. Ships frequently disable their AIS transponders—a practice known as "going dark"—to hide their movements. While the Grumant did experience a data gap between February 8 and 11, it continued to transmit limited information during its stay in Feodosia.

Bellingcat researchers utilized a novel method to verify the ship’s presence: analyzing the vessel’s heading data. While GNSS interference can corrupt a ship’s reported position, the heading data, derived from an onboard gyrocompass, remains relatively unaffected.

Throughout the period in question, the Grumant broadcast a consistent heading of 267–268 degrees. The orientation of the berth at the Port of Feodosia is 267.5 degrees. This near-perfect correlation allowed investigators to mathematically confirm the vessel’s location at the pier, even when the reported GPS coordinates were intentionally falsified.

Charlie Brown, a former US Naval Officer and Senior Advisor at United Against Nuclear Iran, noted that this methodology represents a significant advancement in maritime forensics. "It’s quite standard for the independent gyrocompass to be providing the heading," Brown explained. "Parsing out that data allows us to make reliable inferences even in a spoofing environment."

Official Responses and the Geopolitical Landscape

The complexities of the situation are amplified by the internal political divide in Libya. The country currently functions under two primary administrations: the Government of National Unity (GNU) in the west and the Libyan National Army (LNA) in the east, which has historically maintained close ties with Moscow.

Jalel Harchaoui, a political scientist with the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), emphasizes that while the two administrations are currently in a fragile, long-term truce, the ports remain highly opaque. "The Tripoli government is, in some regards, pro-Ukraine," Harchaoui noted. "But if there is business that can be done with Russia through the very opaque ports, and the right people get paid, the business is going to take place."

When contacted by Bellingcat, the Libyan Embassy in The Netherlands stated that eastern Libya and Benghazi operate outside the administrative control of the GNU, effectively distancing the Tripoli-based government from the transaction. Neither the LNA, the Port of Benghazi, nor the Port of Izmir provided responses to inquiries regarding the Grumant’s cargo.

Implications for International Law and Sanctions

The Ukrainian government has been categorical in its condemnation of these activities. In a joint statement, the Ministry for Development of Communities and Territories and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine characterized the shipment as an illegal act of economic warfare.

"The expansion of such routes to third countries, in particular to North Africa, demonstrates Russia’s ongoing efforts to circumvent international sanctions and monetize resources stolen from the occupied Ukrainian territories," the Ministry stated.

The diplomatic fallout is mounting. Ukraine has officially shared evidence of the Grumant’s illicit activities with diplomatic missions in the UK, Turkey, and Tunisia. This is part of a broader, more aggressive legal strategy. Earlier this year, a Swedish court approved the transfer of the Caffa—another vessel linked to the Russian "shadow grain fleet"—to Ukrainian authorities for investigation. This decision sets a powerful legal precedent: it suggests that nations are moving beyond mere sanctions and fines toward the physical detention and potential confiscation of vessels involved in the smuggling of stolen goods.

Conclusion: A Persistent Threat

The Grumant is far from an isolated case. Records from Kiborg News indicate that the vessel has a documented history of using deceptive shipping practices to deliver grain from Crimea to Syria as far back as 2024. Despite the dissolution of its former operator, the Murmansk Shipping Company, the ship continues to operate under the banner of new entities, such as "Decision/Reshenie" LLC.

As Bellingcat’s investigations continue to reveal, the "shadow fleet" is a resilient, adaptive network. By exploiting loopholes in maritime reporting and leveraging the geopolitical friction of nations like Libya, Russia has created a logistics machine designed to sustain its war effort through the sale of stolen Ukrainian assets.

However, the tide is beginning to turn. The use of advanced open-source intelligence (OSINT) techniques, such as the cross-referencing of satellite imagery with compass-heading data, is narrowing the space in which these vessels can operate. As international legal frameworks harden and data-tracking becomes more sophisticated, the "dark" corners of the maritime world are becoming increasingly illuminated.

Contributors

Youri van der Weide, Galen Reich, Yörük Işık, and Bridget Diakun.

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